EXHIBIT 3

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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK				
3 4	NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, SPRING VALLEY BRANCH, et al.,				
5	Plaintiffs,				
6	v. 17 Civ. 8943 (CS) (JCM) Status conference				
7	EAST RAMAPO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,				
8	Defendants.				
9	Detendants.				
10	x				
11	White Plains, New York December 3, 2018				
12	Before:				
13	THE HONORABLE JUDITH C. McCARTHY,				
14	Magistrate Judge				
15	APPEARANCES				
16	LATHAM & WATKINS				
17	Attorneys for Plaintiffs RUSSELL D. MANGAS MICHAEL FARIS				
18	ELIZABETH A. PARVIS				
19	ADVOCATES FOR JUSTICE, CHARTERED ATTORNEYS				
20	Attorneys for Emilia White and Steven White LAURA D. BARBIERI				
21	100 0111 1 TTTT				
22	MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP Attorneys for Defendant				
23	DAVID J. BUTLER RANDALL M. LEVINE				
24					
25	Digital recording.				

1	APPEARANCES; (Continued)
2	Also Present:
3	TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP Attorneys for Community Connections
4	AVI SCHICK
5	
6	THE DEPUTY CLERK: In the matter of the NAACP versus
7	East Ramapo Central School District.
8	Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.
9	MR. MANGAS: Russell Mangas, Latham & Watkins, on
10	behalf of the plaintiffs.
11	MR. FARIS: Michael Faris, on behalf of plaintiff.
12	MS. PARVIS: Good morning, your Honor.
13	Elizabeth Parvis for the plaintiffs.
14	THE COURT: I'm just going to because of this
15	wonderful sound that we're having, I'm going to ask everybody
16	to really speak up, because I think we're going to have a hard
17	time getting this on the microphone. In fact, if could pull
18	the microphones forward.
19	So I'm going to ask you to say your name again.
20	MS. PARVIS: Certainly.
21	Elizabeth Parvis, also with Latham & Watkins, for
22	plaintiffs.
23	THE COURT: Okay. And then
24	MR. FARIS: Michael Faris.
25	THE COURT: Thank you.

1	MR. BUTLER: Good morning, your Honor.
2	David Butler on behalf of the defendant.
3	THE COURT: Good morning.
4	MR. LEVINE: Good morning, your Honor.
5	Randall Levine for the defendant.
6	THE COURT: I also understand
7	Hi, Ms. Barbieri.
8	We've got Ms. Barbieri here in the courtroom.
9	And, Mr. Schick, are you here?
10	MR. SCHICK: Yes, your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Okay. Great.
12	At some point when we get to the motions that deal
13	with your client, I'll ask you to come up to the podium so you
14	can be heard also. Okay?
15	MR. SCHICK: Thank you.
16	THE COURT: So everybody can be seated. And as you
17	know, just stand when addressing the Court.
18	So I have several outstanding motions made by all
19	parties. I'm going to go through I believe I've got them
20	categorized in five. I'm just going to summarize that when we
21	start, and then I'm going to address each one individually.
22	So I have plaintiffs' motion to quash the subpoenas
23	served on Steve White and Catalist. That is Docket Number 206.
24	There's plaintiffs' letter, District's response to
25	Steve White's subpoenas, Docket Number 210.

	District'	S	response	to	Catalist	subpoenas,	Docket
Number	215.						

Mr. White's response to the District is Docket Number 217.

Plaintiffs' response to Docket Number 215 is Docket 227.

I also have the District motion to quash subpoenas to Mr. Butler, Docket Number 208, Docket Number 219 and Docket Number 223.

I have the District's motion to compel nonparty JAMCAR to comply with a subpoena. JAMCCAR is J-A-M-C-C-A-R. That's Docket Number 213. I did not see a response filed to that.

Then I have the District motion for Ms. White to show cause why she failed to appear at a deposition, Docket Number 214, and Docket Number 217.

And plaintiffs' motion to compel nonparty Community Connections, which is Docket Number 226, 237 and 238.

Okay. We're going to deal with these all in whatever random order I deem worthy.

We're going to start with what I hope is going to be easiest, the District motion to compel nonparty JAMCCAR to comply with the subpoena.

Mr. Butler or Mr. Levine, I don't see any response to that. have you seen any response to that? Have you heard anything?

MR. BUTLER: No, your Honor.

And when your order was issued, you directed us to get in touch with JAMCCAR. We sent them the copy of the order by FedEx and by regular U.S. Mail. We haven't heard a word from them. And you've got it all in our letter as to what other efforts we undertook. They've ignored us.

THE COURT: Okay. Plaintiffs, have you heard from them?

MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, we have not heard from them. We don't represent JAMCCAR.

THE COURT: No, I know you don't. I just thought in case they reached out to someone else before I ruled on this, I wanted to make sure they hadn't reached out to you for some reason in this case.

MR. MANGAS: They have not.

We did a little bit of research on our own, and recognized that the address that's publicly listed on the JAMCCAR Web site is a different address than where defendants served them and sent the letter. So it's not clear to us that JAMCCAR is even aware that they've been served a subpoena.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Butler.

MR. BUTLER: That's the address that they listed with the Secretary of State, as we showed in our papers. That is the address where someone signed and acknowledged receipt, and as we've shown you in our papers. So, you know, what are we supposed to do?

THE COURT: I'm granting this motion to compel as unopposed.

So we can do it a couple of ways. You can send me in a subpoena that I can so order to be served upon them, or just a proposed order attached to their prior subpoena. I'm going to defer to you, Mr. Butler, on what's the best way to do it. And whether you want to issue a new subpoena with my signature on it, or you just want to put in an order that I attach to the prior subpoena proposed order to me, we'll do it that way. Okay?

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So the second one I want to deal with is the District's motion to quash the subpoena to Mr. Butler. This is docket Number 208, District's letter, Docket Number 219 and Docket Number 223.

I'm going to ask the District to very briefly — because I have read everything on this, and we do have a lot to deal with today — very briefly to summarize why you want the Court to quash the subpoena. And then I'll allow plaintiffs to briefly respond. And then I'll rule.

MR. LEVINE: Thank you, your Honor.

As you have said, it is all laid out in the letters that we filed with the Court. The long and short of it is that to depose opposing counsel, opposing litigation counsel, in the

case is extremely disfavored. The plaintiffs would have to make a serious showing as to why they absolutely need to do that, why opposing counsel, Mr. Butler, would have information that they can't get anywhere else. And that would be information that he would have in some way outside of his role as litigation counsel for the District in this case.

They haven't shown that they have any such need. The only thing that they have shown is one text message out of 17,000 pages of text — or 1700 pages of text messages in which Mr. Butler is purportedly giving some advice to his client about what to do for this case, which necessarily means that it's in his role as litigation counsel.

There is no evidence that they've pointed to whatsoever that Mr. Butler has any role outside of his role as litigation counsel. And there is no reason whatsoever to impose a burden on the District to require him to appear for deposition or produce documents that are all going to be privileged or attorney work product.

THE COURT: So just that it's very clear, that one text message is not from Mr. Butler.

MR. LEVINE: Correct.

THE COURT: It's from another individual who is relaying what he believes is a message from — or advice, rather than a message, an advice from Mr. Butler.

MR. LEVINE: Correct.

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the school board. And he was relaying a message to another third party as he sat in his desk.

That individual is Perry Grossman, the president of

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Who's going to be heard on this?

MR. MANGAS: Russell Mangas, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mangas.

And, also, Mr. Mangas, before you proceed, I realize because this is on a court reporter, I should have said — this is on a court transcript, and a reporter at some point is going to probably have to transcribe this, please identify who's speaking first for the ease of the reporter.

Thank you.

You can proceed, Mr. Mangas.

MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, there is a couple of things that we all agree on here.

The first is that there's evidence that Mr. Butler, the attorney for the District, asked the president of the school board, Perry Grossman, to convey to an influential member of the Jewish community, Hersh Horowitz, that it would be good if the community replaced —

THE COURT: I don't think we can all agree on that. I think we can all agree that there is a text message from Mr. Grossman relaying a message that he believes he was given. We don't -- we can't say that that message was given. Do you

1	have what proof do you have, other than the person saying
2	that? You don't have Mr. Butler, and this is his client.
3	Isn't this privileged information? MR. MANGAS: There's no indication that's been
4	MR. MANGAS: There's no indication that's been

MR. MANGAS: There's no indication that's been provided that Mr. Grossman made that up. We have that piece of evidence, and that's all we've heard, is the piece of evidence from Mr. Grossman says —

THE COURT: From an attorney, information he got from an attorney, his attorney.

MR. MANGAS: That his attorney asked him to convey to Mr. Horowitz --

THE COURT: Yes. Okay. Keep going.

MR. MANGAS: — that it would be good if the community placed Sabrina Charles Pierre with a minority candidate who the Jewish community could support.

The other thing that we'd certainly agree on, because the District said it in their letter, is that that communication was not privileged.

There is some other facts that are --

THE COURT: No. That's not what the District said.

Be very careful here. The District said that they produced that because that communication was relayed to another individual, that that communication between Mr. Grossman and that third party was not privileged because it was conveyed. They never said that the communication between Mr. Butler and

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Mr. Grossman was not privileged. That was not said. They have not even said that that privilege was waived. They simply said they produced that because they could not claim a privilege when that information was shared to another.

MR. MANGAS: And, your Honor, that's what I was referring to, is the communication that's been produced in this case. All sides have agreed that is not a privileged communication, the communication from Mr. Grossman to Mr. Horowitz relaying what Mr. Grossman states is Mr. Butler's advice.

THE COURT: And I have ruled that you can take their depositions, and therefore find out more about that communication between them, those two individuals. So why do you need Mr. Butler's.

MR. MANGAS: Well, your Honor --

THE COURT: Why are you turning this — I'm not happy with this motion, as you can see. I just — I read this, and I was shocked. Shocked. I expect a lot more from Latham & Watkins than going kind of in this — you know, taking an attorney who's been working on this case and trying to turn them into a fact witness and trying to say that you should be allowed to take their deposition because one of their clients relayed a message that they allegedly said to another person. That doesn't make an attorney into a fact witness.

You give your client all the time advice, all the

If that person goes and tells someone else that piece of

1 time. 2 advice, does that make you a fact witness? Does that make you 3 now part of this case? Does that allow the other attorney to 4 come in and ask you questions under oath? Should that happen? Should they be allowed, if one of your witnesses, one of your 5 6 experts, one of your consultants that you've hired goes and 7 says something, should they then turn in and say, "Okay. 8 You've advised them to do something a certain way, " and they 9 should be allowed to put you under oath and take questions? 10

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MR. MANGAS: If I'm providing nonlegal advice that I'm asking be conveyed to a third party who is not a client, then yes.

And, your Honor, we agree this isn't a typical situation. And then, as your Honor described it: Shocking. But it's not our actions that have led to this. Whether -- the fact that Mr. Butler --

THE COURT: I think you're making too much of a simple statement you read. And I think you're trying to breach an attorney-client privilege based on that in an inappropriate way. And I think part of it is the fact that -- on both sides -- there is a scorched earth mentality in this case. And so you will go until there is no earth left.

I don't believe that a third — a statement that is from someone that may or may not be an accurate reflection of what Mr. Butler said is going to allow you to open the door and 18c3natMS

ask Mr. Butler questions. I don't think there is any evidence that supports your arguments that Mr. Butler is involved in the slating process. I think he's involved in being a zealous advocate on behalf of his client and providing advice to his client under the attorney-client privilege.

And I am denying this. I'm not — we have so much to do, I'm not going to hear further argument on this. I don't think the evidence that you have submitted before me supports your arguments at all. And I am granting District's motion to quash the subpoena, and I'm not allowing you to depose Mr. Butler on this issue.

MR. MANGAS: Can I be heard briefly for the record, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MANGAS: I'll keep it short.

In terms of the relevance of this communication, it is almost impossible to imagine that it would not be highly probative for the finder of act in this case, Judge Seibel, to know that one of the District's own agents — in this case, Mr. Butler — suggested advice to be conveyed to an influential member of a slating organization in a like community that they should replace a minority-preferred board member with a safe high-preferred candidate. That goes to, one, whether there's an exclusionary mechanism in the District operating in East Ramapo, and two, the District itself discouragement of

responsiveness to the minority community.

And briefly, your Honor, in terms of the privilege issue that's obviously at the heart of that, the District isn't saved by the fact that it was Mr. Butler giving the communication or — in the first instance, or that he appended the magic words that it would be good for the case in his advice to replace Ms. Pierre Charles.

Of course, it would be good for the District's case if they could continue arguing to Judge Seibel, "Look. There are minority candidates on the school board," while obscuring the reality that there is a lot of work behind the scenes to make sure that the only candidates that can make it to the school board are safe candidates acceptable to the white community.

And the fact that it may be good for the case doesn't make that legal advice. An attorney defending a "price fixing" claim could tell his or her client it would be good for the case to convey to competitors that one should raise their price and one should lower it. But that wouldn't convert it into legal advice.

And likewise, here, we've cited — I won't rehash. I know your Honor doesn't want much argument on the topic, but we cited the Chevron case that says when you're providing political advice or other advice that's nonlegal, regardless of whether —

THE COURT: I just don't think you factually have made

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it here at all. You have not met the standards in the Chevron case in this case at all. You've taken a statement by an individual about another person and about advice. The facts are not here to support it. You are going to be allowed to depose these individuals. At least I have ruled that you can depose these individuals. I believe Judge Seibel has affirmed my ruling that you can depose these individuals. Whether that's appealed and changed by the Circuit, you know, that's not here. But in my opinion, you know, to take the deposition of an attorney who's been an attorney on this case from its inception, when you have other means in which you can get information regarding the slating process, regarding, you know, the minority candidates put up, regarding why they put up certain candidates and why they supported others, I don't think you have met what I believe is a higher burden that needs to be met that's sets forth in the case law to take the deposition of an attorney on the case.

So we're going to move on to the next issue.

MR. MANGAS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: The next issue is plaintiffs' motion to compel nonparty Community Connections, which is Docket Numbers 226, 237 and 238.

Mr. Schick, you're going to have an opportunity to respond to this. I'm going to ask — I don't know who for the plaintiffs' side is to go to be heard on this, but I'm going to

1 ask plaintiffs to tell me a little bit more about why they want 2 to get these records. And I specifically want to understand 3 everything you've gotten so far, the nature of this 4 publication, because it's not completely clear to me from 5 reading it -- I have a sense of what it might be -- and what it 6 is that's remaining and why you need it. 7 MR. MANGAS: Certainly, your Honor. And if it's 8 helpful, we've gotten -- we've handed copies to Mr. Schick and 9 the District's attorneys the most recent publication of the 10 community group.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(Pause)

MR. MANGAS: And essentially, to your question -THE COURT: And just for the record, this is

15 Mr. Mangas.

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MR. MANGAS: I'm sorry. Russell Mangas on behalf of the plaintiff.

Thank you, your Honor.

To answer your Honor's question, the Community

Connections is essentially an advertising circular on — as far as we can tell from reviewing episodes, there's no editorial comment, there's no reporting. It's a several hundred page circular of advertisements.

THE COURT: Is this -- because you've handed me a document. Is this one, or is this like, you know -- how would

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this come in? Would this come in this thick? Is this multiple ones? Does this come in as individual pages?

MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, our understanding is that that is a circular that's circulated on hard copy throughout the Monsey community, I think to 12,000 or so Orthodox families in the community.

The version that you're looking at is the PDF version of that to make available for download on the Community Connections Web site.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MANGAS: I'm happy to have Mr. Schick pose today if there is more — if there are more facts to be had, but that's our understanding.

In terms of your Honor's first question, what has been produced, one of the things that we asked for were political advertisements placed on behalf of candidates for the District School Board, and Community Connections has produced 28 such advertisements which represents the advertisements in its possession, custody or control responsive to that request since 2010.

The information that we are continuing to seek is two-fold. Number one is information sufficient to identify the individuals who placed and paid for those 28 advertisements; and number two, information as to whether Community Connections has rejected requests for advertisements relating to a

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candidate running for the school board.

A bit of nuance to that second request, we had initially asked for documents or information related to any advertisements that have been rejected for school board candidates. Through the meet—and—confer process, we were told that it would be very onerous to review all of the advertising requests and records. We agreed that we would be satisfied if Community Connections went to whatever individuals had the knowledge of advertisements, entities seeking to place advertisements, and they could talk to those individuals and tell us, in the first instance, whether or not Community Connections has, indeed, rejected any advertisements.

So those are the two things that we currently seek today.

Community Connections — the information we seek is relevant, because, as I said, Community Connections is a weekly circular. But it has included advertisements for school board candidates. It goes to, I would believe, 12,000 families in the Monsey area targeted towards the Orthodox community, which, as your Honor is aware, are almost exclusively white individuals.

We recently deposed Kalman Weber, a member of that community, who runs an organization and is the sole member of an organization called the Southeast Ramapo Taxpayers'

Association, or SERTA. Mr. Weber's had involvement in several

board elections supporting candidates through financial contributions or placing advertisements on their behalf, providing them with SERTA endorsement. And Mr. Weber testified at his deposition that one of the ways that he sought to bring out the vote for school board elections was to place

advertisements in the Community Connections magazine.

Notwithstanding that, we showed Mr. Weber somewhere in the neighborhood of 15 or so advertisements that bore either his name or the name of the Southeast Ramapo Taxpayers' Association endorsement, and he disclaimed that those were actually his advertisements, and testified that there must be others in the community that are placing advertisements for school board candidates and using his name.

So it's not as simple --

THE COURT: And using his name?

MR. MANGAS: Using his name or using the name of his organization. He testified to both instances.

THE COURT: Okay. So he testified that he has placed ads in this circular.

MR. MANGAS: That's correct.

THE COURT: But that the ones you showed him were not ads that he had placed. They were ones placed using his name or his organization's name, but they were replaced by him.

MR. MANGAS: That's correct, with one refinement on that, which is not all the advertisements we showed him were

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Community Connections advertisements. We had a whole series of campaign advertisements and endorsements and --

THE COURT: But some that were in Community

Connections that has his name or his organization's name were

not placed by him.

MR. MANGAS: According to him.

THE COURT: Yes. You would think he might know.

MR. MANGAS: We would hope so.

And so that's why a lot of these advertisements, 28 advertisements that have been produced, many of them, indeed, say Southeast Ramapo Taxpayers' Association, or have Kalman Weber's name. But as he himself has testified, that doesn't mean that he funded or placed all those advertisements.

And so that's the information that we are still seeking. The bases of relevance is — and I'll quote from Community Connections letter to the Court, which I believe is Docket —

237?

— Docket 237. It's relevant to the slating process. They quote a case, Community Connections has in its letter, at Docket 237, where they say, "The candidate slating inquiry focuses on whether there is a process in which some influential nongovernment organization selects and endorses a group or slate of candidates, rendering the election little more than a stamp of approval for the candidate's selection."

We have no quibble with that case cite, and that's exactly what we're seeking here.

THE COURT: Can you -- I have the document in front of me. Can you direct me to the right page?

MR. MANGAS: I believe it's on Page 2 of Docket 237.

The case is Pope versus City of Albany.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. MANGAS: And so our position, your Honor, is that we're entitled to that information and to understand who was involved in the slating organization and how it works. And if there are influential members of the white Orthodox communities who are financing campaigns or making endorsements or placing campaign advertisements that for the last several years have helped ensure that the white preferred candidates have been elected, plaintiffs are entitled to that information.

Likewise, if Community Connections is lending its support to the slating organization by advertising for white preferred candidates, but refusing to place advertisements or allow circulation of advertisements in their magazines to the 12,000 or so families in the Monsey community, that is highly probative information as to not only the existence of a slating organization, but the effectiveness.

THE COURT: Can't a paper refuse to run certain ads?

Don't they have that prerogative?

MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, we're not arguing that

they're required to run the ads, only that it's probative if they're running ads exclusively for white preferred candidates and refusing to run ads for minority preferred candidates. But as far as I know, your Honor, no, they are not required to run a particular advertisement.

THE COURT: Is there — because — and then I'm going to let Mr. Schick respond to some of these questions that I'm asking.

Is there — I think you might have answered this at the beginning, but remind me. There was a burdensome argument being made by Mr. Schick.

How have you dealt with that on the issue of any rejection of ads?

MR. MANGAS: So — right. There are two burden arguments that Mr. Schick makes, one that it would be too burdensome to tell us who paid for the 28 advertisements they did produce, and then second, that it would be too burdensome to tell us whether or not they rejected ads for other candidates for school board.

Initially, we requested documents related to the rejection of any advertisement for campaign for school board. We were told that that was too burdensome. And so we agreed that we would be satisfied with an interim step, which is to talk to whoever it is at Community Connections that's responsible for receiving advertisement requests, and would be

knowledgeable about those types of requests and the documents, and to interview that person and ask them, "Do you — have you rejected in the past any advertising requests?" and if the answer is "No," represent that to us in writing, and that will end the issue. And they've continued to maintain that that's too burdensome to engage in.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MANGAS: The only other point I wanted to make, your Honor, if your Honor is so inclined, is the First Amendment arguments that have been made with respect to the journalistic privilege. That does — the journalistic privilege does not apply to Community Connections here for two reasons.

Number one, it's not a newspaper. It's a weekly savings guide. We cite a case, Bulow versus — Von Bulow by Auersberg versus Von Bulow, a Southern District of New York case, in our paper for the proposition that the journalistic privilege only applies to a professional journalistic effort in news reporting; and second, and very related, the advertisements themselves, even if Community Connections were a journalistic enterprise, which it's not, even if it were, the advertisements themselves are not reporting. And advertisements are not protected by any journalistic privilege that requires — I mean we're, all familiar with the archetype of protecting your sources in reporting, and the reasons for

why you wouldn't compel a journalist to disclose sources and means and methods, et cetera, because it could put a real chill on that type of reporting. That concern doesn't exist here.

We've cited the case, Chevron versus Berlinger in our papers for that proposition.

And, indeed, your Honor, the type of disclosures that we're asking for, who paid for political advertisements, are the type of information that's commonly compelled in the "campaign finance" context. And we cite Citizens United for that proposition.

Unless your Honor has further questions, I'll cede the mike.

THE COURT: Do you want to address the other First Amendment issue they have which sounds like a --

MR. MANGAS: Right. So they make a --

THE COURT: That makes the chilling and freedom of association type --

MR. MANGAS: A "right to association" argument, yes. Right.

And they claim — both Community Connections and the defendants claim in their letters that are subpoenas, quote, targeting people because of their associations with political advocacy organizations, and that we're asking for compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy.

Community Connections letter goes on, on Page 4, Footnote 3, to

claim that if they were somehow required to disclose who paid for these advertisements, that any entity that publishes endorsement of a political candidate could be required to disclose its donor and volunteer lists, enforced to divulge who it met and consulted with in deciding to make an endorsement.

Your Honor, that's not correct. We're not asking for that information. We're asking very simply to identify who paid for 28 political advertisements that Community Connections has already produced. And those political advertisements are for candidates who exclusively have been the white preferred candidate of choice under our racially polarized voting analysis, and who have won.

It's highly relevant information. They don't cite a single case that says you can't be required to disclose who paid for a political advertisement.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Mangas.

Okay. Mr. Schick, I'll let you speak.

MR. SCHICK: Thank you, your Honor.

Good morning.

Avi Schick on behalf of nonparty Community Connections.

I want to start by just briefly responding to several things that Mr. Mangas said, but even before that, to just talk about the reason we're here today on the subpoena that we received in August is because the subpoena itself was wildly

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It was not at all focused on the school board overbroad. elections. In fact, your Honor, it sought every political ad regarding every election going back well over a decade. And unfortunately, it took us weeks and months of back-and-forth and expense to get plaintiffs to finally agree that their subpoena in this case should be limited to the school board elections that is the focus of this case. And we reached out to them in August when we got the subpoena. We spoke with them in a meet-and-confer September 7th about that issue. none of the lawyers who have ever spoken with me bothered to should show up today. But that's the reality here. So we had weeks and weeks of e-mails, phone conferences, and correspondence just to understand that -- to get them to understand and to get them to explain to us why this case -why this subpoena would involve anything beyond the school board elections.

So when they finally agreed to limit it to the school board elections, we promptly, as they acknowledge, produced all the ads going back to 2010 — they also agreed to a time limitation — regarding the school board election. But, of course, as everybody has acknowledged this morning, this is a "scorched earth" case. And so the question is: If they get to go beyond the advertisements and they get — and again, their subpoena is not limited to who paid for it, but it's broader than that. If they get to go beyond the advertisements, your

Honor, to the question of who had any involvement with respect to the placing of the payment of the ad, there's no — that may end Community Connections' involvement with this, but there's no doubt they'll be back in front of you, your Honor, "We want to subpoen that person."

THE COURT: Well, you know they already have subpoenaed or are trying to depose that person.

MR. SCHICK: It may be. But there's a "scorched earth" approach here, your Honor, which puts a chill on any interaction with any entity, even a newspaper, that, you know, somehow touches on this election.

And I want to address: Is Community Connections a newspaper? It surely is. Do they run editorials? They surely occasionally do. The fact — I don't know on what basis Mr. Mangas said to this Court in his first words that they deliver it to Orthodox Jewish homes. I don't believe there's any truth to that assertion. I am sure that the distribution is geographically limited. But the idea that they pick out Orthodox Jewish homes, which what plaintiffs' attorney just told this Court, is almost surely false.

THE COURT: Are you telling — are you telling me that this is going to more than Orthodox Jewish communities?

MR. SCHICK: I believe its distribution is geographic, so within geographic bounds, your Honor -

THE COURT: Mr. Schick --

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1	MR. SCHICK: within geographic bounds
2	THE COURT: Mr. Schick, you're not answering my
3	question.
4	One can, in certain communities, if one is
5	geographically limiting where something is sent, one can be
6	sending it to only the Jewish communities. And so my question
7	to you and it may be geographically bound, but is it only
8	sent to the Jewish communities?
9	MR. SCHICK: I believe the question is: Is it only
10	sent to Orthodox Jewish homes? The answer would probably be
11	no.
12	THE COURT: Do you believe has your client told you
13	that this publication is
14	What is the target audience of this publication?
15	MR. SCHICK: It's people who live within a certain
16	geographic area who presumably would then shop at stores that
17	service that geographic area, which would help solicit
18	advertisements from businesses that want to obtain customers

advertisements from businesses that want to obtain customers within that area.

But, your Honor --

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THE COURT: Half of this publication is -- I'm not Is it considered Hebrew, or Yiddish?

MR. SCHICK: Well, the letters used -- the letters are The alphabet used is the same, your Honor. the same.

THE COURT: Okay. The pictures are all showing

Orthodox Jewish community.

MR. SCHICK: Your Honor, I'm not disputing that the overwhelming majority of people within that geographic area are going to be members of that community. I'm just pointing out that Mr. Mangas said straight out they deliver it to Orthodox Jewish homes. I don't believe that's correct.

But if we can move beyond that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, I think he should.

MR. SCHICK: If we can move beyond that, your Honor.

There is no doubt that they're a publication that's entitled to whatever First Amendment privileges exist.

Plaintiffs first took the position that because it's an online publication — I'm sorry — that because it's a publication that is supported by advertisements and not subscriptions, it's not entitled to any such protections. We went back and forth with them on that. They sort of withdrew that argument, and now said because it's, you know, primarily advertisements. I don't think — we don't think any of those things matter.

With respect to the two issues, two outstanding issues, that they're seeking to compel, starting with the last one with respect to rejected ads, we asked them, quite specifically, "Do you have any information that would help us to search for this?" In other words, information could be placed by or on behalf of a specific candidate or organization or with respect to a specific school board election. We said,

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"Do you have any such information that would allow us to go back and say, 'Okay. There's an allegation that in the 2013 election or that this particular candidate or this particular organization put in ads or sought to put in ads'?" And they said that's not their job, and so they came back with nothing on that.

And again, with respect to the ads themselves, I know that plaintiffs today lean quite heavily on Mr. Weber. We were not provided, of course, with the entire transcript of Mr. Weber, but plaintiffs did append literally two pages as Exhibit J of their letter. And what I see there is a question on Page 161, which is one of the pages they provided, a question by a Ms. Elsner that says on Line 9, "Mr. Weber, today we have gone through approximately 10 advertisements. And you testified that you weren't responsible for any of them. Correct?" and his answer appears on Line 13, and it says, "I don't know. I wasn't responsible for any of them?" Question mark. "I don't remember." Period. "There was nothing that I have done there?" Question mark. "the ones that you showed today" -- comma -- "yes, that's correct. I didn't do any of them."

Now, I don't think that that snippet of testimony, which in one paragraph of an answer goes back and forth between what he remembers or doesn't remember with respect to any particular ad and whether those ads were Community Connections

ads, when Mr. Mangas represented today that Mr. Weber testified, again in the transcript that they didn't provide me, but Mr. Mangas — but Mr. Weber testified that he did use, and his organization, Southeast Ramapo Taxpayers' Association, did use — did place ads in Community Connections.

And going beyond that, your Honor, this does raise the issue, we're not involved in this case. We're Docket Number 230-something, so there's a lot that's transpired before us, and there's a lot that will transpire after us. So these are not our issues.

But it does seem that the idea of an advertisement that's placed the week of the election by a candidate who's decided to run or not to run, who's on the ballot already in which there's an advertisement that says, "Vote for this candidate" or "not vote for this candidate," whatever the advertisement might say, and you know, it represents that it's sponsored by a particular organization, if it's so represented or not, that's all the information that's necessary for this case. It's hard to see how it involves slating, when it only involves candidates who have already been chosen.

The ads say what they say. Whether or not -- and I have no idea what's beyond the ads. We have not gone to look. But whether or not a third party, whoever that may be, helped pay for the cost of the ad says nothing to any message that a voter received, says nothing to anything of any super secret

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organization here. A voter getting a message gets the message in the ad that we have been produced — that we have already produced. There is nothing that's communicated to a voter by a credit card number that was offered after the election to pay for the ad that was placed the day before the election.

So it really goes to none of the issues involved in slating or anything else. It is protected. Community connections is a publication. They are trying to go into our confidential files which will result a chilling effect ultimately with respect to the communities, whoever it is, interaction with this publication.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just say something, Mr. Schick.

I read the questions that were posed to Mr. Weber. the question starts at 9 and the answer starts at 13, and the following question at 18 and the answer that starts at 22, as Mr. Weber saying that the ones that he was showed today he does not know who's responsible for putting — that he did not do any of them, and that although they said they were sponsored by him or his organization, they weren't. So I think he's pretty clear about what he's saying, that there are some of the ads that he was shown that were not sponsored by him.

Now, we do have Mr. Mangas saying that not all those ads were in Community Connections, but some were.

MR. SCHICK: Well, if I could say, your Honor, if some

1 were, let them -- let them produce to us --

THE COURT: Well, they have. They've got — they have 28 ads that they have from you. And they want to know — so you're saying —

MR. SCHICK: Let them ask Mr. Weber.

THE COURT: -- if they ask for only Mr. Weber's ad information, you would give that to them?

MR. SCHICK: I'm saying, your Honor, if they said,
"Look. We showed these three ads to Mr. Weber." They don't
tell us how many of the ads. We had produced — I'm not sure
what date this deposition was. Somebody can probably enlighten
us on that. It does say the 15th of November. I think we had
produced our ads by then. So they have all of our ads. If
they didn't show him all of the ads, that's on them. They had
all of the, all 28 ads. They had Mr. Weber I don't know for
how many hours. I guess I could see what time it started.

THE COURT: But how burdensome is it to give them this information?

MR. SCHICK: It's quite burdensome. They have to go back to 2010 to try to find through records. So it's burdensome just as a straight-up matters of figuring out what payment was associated with what ad going back more than eight years. This goes back to, I think, May 2010. So just straight up on us, it's burdensome.

THE COURT: So tell me about the rejection. How is it

burdensome to ask whoever might have knowledge of it what -"Had you rejected any ads?"

MR. SCHICK: Your Honor, it's very hard to come with a definitive response to, you know, sort of a hypothetical negative. You know, do I know if they're going to say — because my concern here, given the "scorched earth" nature of this, is, they're playing a game with us here. Because I've asked them, if they have somebody or some time frame or some election or some candidate or some entity that tried to place an ad. And they said, "Not telling you."

And then I say, so I go back and I say, "Does anybody remember, you know, rejecting an ad?" Now, I don't know what "rejecting an ad" means. Right? But let's say they're going to come up with somebody who's going to say, "Oh, Ms. So-and-so says she called one day, and she said, 'Will you take my ad, you know, that says "Don't vote for Jews"? or something. And they hung up, or they didn't follow up.'" I don't know. So without — it's easy for me to ask that simple question, your Honor. But, of course, they don't want the question. They then want a legal representation that for a period of almost a decade, nobody who worked there ever interacted with somebody and rejected an ad for whatever reason. Maybe the person said they couldn't pay. Maybe the person said they wanted to say nasty things. I don't know.

So if they would give me something to work with, it

would be easier. But my fear is, given the way this case has been litigated, that this is the beginning. While they represent as the end, "All we want is a representation from Mr. Schick that there's no such rejection," what they really want is us to say that, and then litigate further.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Schick.

Mr. Butler or Mr. Levine, do you want to be heard?

MR. BUTLER: Just very briefly, your Honor.

In our letter, we lay out --

David Butler for the District.

Your Honor, in our letter, we lay out the legal argument. And the reason why we're even entering into this particular debate, the distinction that the plaintiffs ignore between minority groups and minority-preferred candidates, as set out in the case law, is just important for purposes of this entire case. And we lay that out in our papers. I'm not going to expand upon that now. You've read it. You understand that.

The other issue that I did want to talk about, though, is one that really hasn't been addressed by either the plaintiffs and, therefore, not by Mr. Schick, and that's the issue of racial appeal. It is alleged in plaintiffs' papers with respect to ads that appear in Community Connections.

They try to bootstrap an argument that somehow because certain ads allegedly make certain racial appeals, that is the basis upon which they say it will be relevant and necessary and

appropriate for them to take discovery from Community

Connections, because they want to look into that further, see
who's doing it, who's sponsoring it, who's saying it, and so on
and so forth. there's nothing that they have shown you,
nothing in any of the papers that they have appended to their
letter, that reflects a racial appeal.

We set out in our papers at Page 3 of our letter the instances where "the other" is discussed, or where a particular candidate is identified as being somehow wrong or improper or against the Torah or against the Jewish people. And we explain exactly what it is. And you know what? Plaintiffs know that. They know that full well.

They know that, for example, the Moster family, which is an Orthodox Jewish family in Ramapo, is opposed, very publicly, to certain aspects of Jewish communal education. That's an open issue. It's the subject of litigation in the courts. It's the subject of discussion in the District. Everyone knows about this. And for someone to put an ad that says that the candidacy of Mrs. Moster is opposed by certain aspects of the Jewish community, that has nothing to do with race. Nothing at all. And for the plaintiffs to come into court and say that those kinds of statements are reflective of racial bias, racial appeal, and therefore in support of their argument that somehow, there's a Voting Rights Act violation, when members of the Orthodox Jewish community support certain

principles on policy, on tax and other issues, with not a stitch of evidence to show anything racial, it's just unacceptable.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Butler.

Counsel, do you want to respond?

Hold on one second.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Do you want to respond?

MR. MANGAS: Thank you, your Honor.

Russell Mangas on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Your Honor, I'll respond briefly to a couple of points Mr. Butler made, and then a couple of other points that Mr. Schick made.

Starting with the issue of minority candidates versus minority-preferred candidates, it's important, your Honor, to take a step back. And all of us understand that the Voting Rights Act is intended to ensure that minority voters — not minority candidates, but minority voters — have a fair opportunity to vote for and elect representatives of their choice. Clearly, if the white community is able to identify safe candidates that happen to be black or Latino and put them up and deny minority voters, as opposed to candidates, the opportunity to vote for someone else that they prefer, that's a violation of the Voting Rights Act. That's the issue that permeates this entire case. That's the issue that is a focus

of plaintiffs.

With respect to racial appeals in advertisements; again, I'm going to take a step back. And today, we spent most of our time — and I think the — it's not the only basis for the relevance of discovery. The main basis, which we've talked about extensively, is the issue of slating. But in terms of racial appeals, I'll point out two — and then there's case law — we didn't have a reply on this, but there's case law that says setting up an "us versus them" or a "that candidate is not one of us," those are racial appeals — those can be racial appeals.

There are two in particular — and I apologize, because I don't have pen cites in front of me, but there's an advertisement placed in Community Connections relevant to this case that says, quote, "We must all come out and vote for our community's candidates." Full stop. There's another that says, "Do you know that as soon as the" — quote — "'preserve Ramapo' candidates are elected" — and those are referring to minority—supported candidates — "'preserve Ramapo' will try to obtain all of your (unintelligible) information." Question mark. Question mark. And a graphic of a white man watching his home being demolished.

But the important thing to keep in mind, your Honor, is, we don't have to decide today whether that's a racial appeal or whether that's admissible. The issue today is

whether it's likely to lead to admissible evidence, and we've certainly met the discovery standard.

Turning from those issues --

THE COURT: I'm struggling with understanding the relevance of the rejected ones.

MR. MANGAS: The relevance of the rejected ones goes to knowing whether a slating organization exists, but how it works and who's involved. And if you have a community circular that reaches a large proportion of the white electorate, an electorate which we can go back, you know, at least over the last five years, and say has been sufficient to elect a candidate.

THE COURT: But a community circular, a newspaper, they're allowed to, you know — they don't have to put every ad that comes before them. They don't have to accept every ad that comes before them. So how is the ones rejected — well, I know it supports your argument that it's a — you know, it's only going to do the, you know, religious ads from — you know, that are going to target the candidates that are going to support the community. But if this circular rejects some of them, so let's say they did. You know, I still am struggling with: What does that really show you? Why can't they do that?

MR. MANGAS: Well, your Honor, just to be clear, our argument is not that they can't do that, or that they're legally —

THE COURT: Okay. So if they do do that, why is that a problem?

MR. MANGAS: Because that's evidence of not only is there a slating organization, but this community circular is a part of it. So if you have a group of —

THE COURT: But aren't you going to be able to get that more through depositions of people in the organization? You know, that's where you're going to find this information out, you know. Do you have evidence that they've rejected anything?

MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, I'm not aware of any evidence that they've rejected an advertisement.

And just to correct the record, I don't believe that my colleague, Ms. Elsner, told Mr. Schick that she's not telling him of any. I believe what she told him was that "We don't have evidence of rejected advertisements to provide you with."

The relevance of it, your Honor, is, if there is — and we know for a fact that — we want to call it a "slating mechanism" or just — whatever you want to call it, it's been highly effective in mobilizing the vote for white-preferred candidates. I mean, across the board, the slate of white-preferred candidates every year, each one of those people gets almost exactly the same number of votes, with very little variation.

So there is some mechanism in the community that's enabling that and facilitating that. It's a very abnormal thing to happen in an election. And it happens here in East Ramapo every single year.

And so, your Honor, if there are a group of members of the community who are responsible for vetting and selecting acceptable candidates, and there is a circular who — we have testimony from Mr. Weber who believes is a very effective way of mobilizing the vote and telling that community, whether you want to call it the "Orthodox community" or the "white community," they're all white, they're almost all Orthodox, telling them, "Here's the candidates that you should go vote for," and refusing to provide information or advertisements for the minority-preferred candidates, it's highly probative of a slating organization and its effectiveness.

THE COURT: So how do you address Mr. Schick's concern that, you know, it's overburdensome to find the rejected ones, and he's concerned if — you know, that you know, he's going to ask someone, and they're going to say, "We haven't rejected any," and then you're come up, you know, in the course of this case, finding someone, who said, "Oh, yes. I called, and they said they wouldn't take my advertisement," and you know, then they're like, "Ah—ha. You withheld information," which is, I think, a legitimate concern Mr. Schick has. So how do you address that issue?

MR. MANGAS: So to the end, it's a burden portion of that argument. There's only one school board election a year. We're not asking them to determine whether they've ever rejected an advertisement —

THE COURT: Yes, but I'm looking at a flyer that has a tremendous amount of advertisements in it that -- .

How often is this produced?

MR. SCHICK: Weekly, your Honor.

MR. MANGAS: I believe it's every weekly.

THE COURT: Every week. That means the records that they have ever things that, you know, might come in or might not come in for this is probably large. And I'm hearing from an officer of the Court that — and you heard during the meet—and—confer that the records that they have, the way they can do it, they don't have the ability to do it easily, that it is too burdensome for them.

So I appreciate the fact that you have narrowed down your request to try to make it less burdensome, but Mr. Schick has a concern still, because he's worried about talking to someone who may say to him, "No," and then there may have been someone else who answered the phone and said something different.

MR. MANGAS: Well, your Honor, with all due respect to that argument, I mean, these are — this is clearly a very hot — the school board elections are a "hot button" issue in

1 the District and in the Orthodox community. And I don't think 2 it is at all outlandish to expect that if whoever is in charge 3 for placing the advertisements at Community Connections got a 4 call from a candidate who is not one of the slate, who is 5 outside of the Orthodox community, and said, "Hey, I'd like to 6 place an advertisement for my own campaign" or "against the 7 campaign of the candidate you're advertising for, " that 8 someone -- that would be burdensome to them. I believe that 9 would be a fairly easy --10 THE COURT: Do you know if there is such a person 11 who's responsible for that? 12 MR. MANGAS: We don't. We haven't been provided that 13 information. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Schick, how does the organization --15 Mr. Levine, if you could put the microphone in front 16 of Mr. Schick. 17 No, you can stay there. 18 MR. SCHICK: I'm sorry, your Honor. 19 I don't think there's any such single person. 20 And beyond that, Mr. Mangas in three moments said two 21 entirely contradictory things. On the one hand, he's 22 essentially trying to make Community Connections at least a 23 part of the slating organization. That's what he said. On the

other hand, he's saying, people outside the slate are trying to

work with it. We can't be both. We're not either, candidly.

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We're not either. But everything I heard from Mr. Mangas gets me more concerned, because that's what he said, we are part of the slating process, you know. And there's no basis for that.

And just to go one step beyond that, your Honor, each of the ads that we produced, each of the ads, 28 ads, I believe, was run the week of the school board election in May, which means that the candidates had all been — decided to run, got themselves on the ballot. The idea that an ad that Community Connections ran in the several days leading up to the election when the candidates had been chosen, that that somehow deprived any candidate of the ability to run for office cannot be true. They had all decided whether to run, got their names on the ballot or not, and then we decided — you know, someone ran an ad, either opposing — somebody ran an ad in favor of several candidates. There's no way that that Community Connections ad deprived anybody of any right.

And beyond that, more importantly in this case, since we produced all the ads, there's no way that if there was a third-party sponsor of the ad that was run in third-party Community Connections newspaper, that that somehow would have any impact on the slating process.

THE COURT: You want to respond to that, Mr. Mangas?

MR. MANGAS: Yes, your Honor.

I think that's actually very helpful information, which is that the ads for the school board run during one week

in May prior to the elections. So it's not a burdensome task to say, you know, produce advertisements since 2010, go back for the week before the school board elections for each of those years that there's a school board election, inquire as to whether there were any political advertisements for school board that were rejected. The notion that —

THE COURT: I'm concerned. I have the same concern that Mr. Schick has. You know, we're asking now for a memory that goes back ten years, where if they don't have records of rejection, if they don't keep the rejection records, I think the memory is not reliable.

MR. MANGAS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: They're concerned that they may say "No," and then find out that you found someone who called and they said "Yes," that they did tell them not to send it in, you know, that there was a rejection.

MR. MANGAS: So two things on that point, your Honor.

I mean, first, the notion that we've got someone who called up and as part of the litigation strategy tried to place some filthy ad or —

THE COURT: No one's accusing you --

MR. MANGAS: I can represent --

THE COURT: I didn't say that. Mr. Schick didn't say that. They're saying that you may have — you have not come across a fact witness yet that has said they have been

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rejected. But they're concerned, what if you bump into someone — you take a deposition of someone who says, "My ad was rejected"?

MR. MANGAS: Well, I can --

THE COURT: And they don't have any recollection of that, and it's a "he said, she said."

Now, they aren't saying you're creating that information, but they're concerned with the reliability of someone's memory.

MR. MANGAS: So, your Honor, we would be satisfied if instead of — if they're not comfortable relying on the institutional memory of the people that work there, if they want to go back — and we're willing to make it very narrow — to a week or, say, two weeks before the school board election —

THE COURT: How many years are you willing to go back?

Ten is too many.

MR. MANGAS: Why don't we say eight.

THE COURT: For the rejections.

MR. MANGAS: I would say eight for the advertisements they've produced.

I mean, if there's a year they haven't produced an advertisement, we could agree they don't need to do it for that year. But for the 28 they produced for those years —

THE COURT: We're talking about rejections. How

far — I want to narrow the rejections. I want to give you a sampling. Because I think it is burdensome. I don't know what kind of records they keep. It doesn't sound like, you know, they have these records easily accessible. Or otherwise, Mr. Schick would have said that you could get them. On the rejections alone — that's all I'm focusing on right now — I want to do a narrow sampling of whether in that period they rejected.

MR. MANGAS: How about we go back to the five most recent elections. So it would be '13, '15, '16, '17, and '18. And the two weeks leading up to the election, search the documents and produce anything relevant to whether they've rejected an advertisement.

THE COURT: So what years do you want to go back?

MR. MANGAS: '13, '15, '16, '17, and '18.

THE COURT: And why did you skip '14?

MR. MANGAS: There wasn't a contested election in '14.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MANGAS: And, your Honor, just to correct the record, Mr. Schick made an argument that why we had their advertisements before we deposed Mr. Weber, we could have put those advertisements in front of him and we chose not to.

That's incorrect. In fact, we deposed Mr. Weber on the morning of November 15th. Community Connections did not produce advertisements until later that evening, after the deposition

was closed. Mr. Weber was gone.

MR. SCHICK: I'll just say two points on that, your Honor.

The first is, they asked us to produce the documents by the 15th, which is when we produced it.

The more important point --

So if they needed it that morning, they should have told us, your Honor, because we weren't playing that kind of game here. They asked us for the 15th. All the correspondence shows that. We produced it when they asked us.

More importantly, your Honor, what they're now saying is, turns out they had Community Connections advertisements for the school board all while they're litigating this, because they had, they say, I don't know how many, they haven't said, to put before Mr. Weber.

So again, it goes --

THE COURT: Well, I'm sure if they spent the time looking through the Community Connections book during that, they might have been able to get them on their own. This is not private. But we don't need to address that, because I'm not getting involved in that. You know, I'm not — I see no nefarious motives on malfeasance on anybody's side here. I think everybody is just zealously representing their client.

Here's what we're going to do. I do believe, although the -- I don't -- I don't know whether any of this evidence

will be admissible in the long run. I do believe there's enough relevance that I can deal with some of the burdensomeness on the 28 ads that have been produced. I'm going to direct that Community Connections provide the plaintiffs — and, of course, the District, also — with information on who paid for and placed that ad.

MR. SCHICK: Your Honor, if I can ask, limited to paid for? To go beyond — again, I have no idea. To go into correspondence, again, of who might have placed means — I think if you look at their most recent letter, they limit it to who paid for the ad.

THE COURT: Yes, who paid for the ad.

MR. SCHICK: Okay.

THE COURT: And then on the rejections, if there's any rejections, we're going to narrow that. We're not going to go back to '13. We're going to '15 through '18, so '15, '16, '17, and '18. If there are any ads rejected for that week prior to the election, when you typically — you know I'm going to week to two weeks, those ads you typically put in relating to the school board, if there are any ads rejected. And then whatever information you can provide for leading to that — I'm not sure what you have, but if you have information that shows that something was rejected, some correspondence or anything like that, I'm going to ask you to produce that. But if it's simply a yes—or—no answer, as long as it's given by someone who has

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1	knowledge and knows and can answer that question. Okay?
2	MR. MANGAS: Thank you, your Honor.
3	MR. SCHICK: Your Honor, we'll look for any ads that
4	were sent in that might have rejected. And I'll certainly ask
5	my client to look for them. I don't know when that you
6	know, given their production schedule in fact, for the time
7	that I'm going to the West Coast, but I will ask them to look
8	for any ads that were submitted that were ultimately not run.
9	And then I will get back to counsel for both parties.
10	THE COURT: What kind of time do you need?
11	MR. SCHICK: I assume two weeks, just given my own
12	THE COURT: Yes. No, that's I think reasonable.
13	Today is the 3rd. To December 7th 17th.
14	MR. SCHICK: If you make it the 18th, just get it in
15	on the schedule.
16	THE COURT: Yes. December 18th.
17	Thank you, Mr. Schick.
18	MR. SCHICK: Thank you, your Honor.
19	(Pause)
20	THE COURT: Okay. The next issue is plaintiffs'
21	motion to quash subpoenas to Steve White and Catalist.
22	Is there anyone here on behalf of Catalist?
23	MR. MANGAS: I don't believe so.
24	THE COURT: And I don't believe I received any
25	separate objections on behalf of Catalist, just the District's

response.

Let's deal with Catalist first, because Catalist is actually, I think, pretty easy.

The Catalist subpoena had a return to D.C. I'm Just going to ask the plaintiffs to address one thing. Why do I have jurisdiction?

MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, Russell Mangas on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Your Honor has jurisdiction to control discovery in this case. I think, in the interests of full disclosure, a motion to quash was the wrong way to style the Catalist motion initially. We have since styled that as a motion for a protective order. And there is case law — and I can cite it for you — that says your Honor has the ability to — in a protective order, prohibiting discovery via subpoena in other districts, and particularly in cases where it's important that there be a consistent rule. And the case I'm referring to is another one of the Chevron cases, and it was privilege in that instance, too. And the Court issued an order prohibiting the defendants from getting evidence via subpoena in other jurisdictions.

THE COURT: In my experience, I don't have jurisdiction.

MR. MANGAS: I would ask your Honor, to the extent you're inclined to (unintelligible) it today that we get an

opportunity to brief that issue, because it would have been an additional reply to some of their arguments.

THE COURT: Mr. Butler or Mr. Levine?

MR. LEVINE: This is Randall Levine for the District.

I agree with the Court that the Court does not have jurisdiction to quash a subpoena issued from the District of Columbia, where compliance is required in the District of Columbia.

However, we don't want to undertake the additional burden of opening a new matter in the District of Columbia any more than the plaintiffs do. There may be a way to cut to the chase, which is that the plaintiffs have admitted in their papers that they have the documents that we are seeking. They are simply withholding them on the basis of a privilege or "work product" protection, that they have not explained. And they also have not served us a privilege log setting out whatever documents they are that they say are privileged and explaining the basis for withholding them.

So one way, perhaps, to avoid dealing with the out-of-circuit subpoena would be for the Court to compel the plaintiffs to produce the documents that they're withholding or, at the very least, to compel them to produce a privilege log so those documents can be reviewed in camera by the Court to determine whether there is any sound basis to withhold them.

And Catalist can stay in Washington, D.C. And if we

need to enforce the subpoena against them at some point later, maybe we can. But if we can get the documents directly from the plaintiffs, that seems to be the faster way to do it.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mangas, I want to hear from you on it.

Because we have to deal with Mr. White, I think this is what I'm going to do. I am going to deny plaintiffs' motion to quash, without prejudice, and — or here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to grant your request to withdraw this motion, and I am going to allow you to move forward — because I do not have jurisdiction. And I work very well with other magistrate judges in other jurisdictions on these types of issues, where it goes before them and we work together to get things quickly done and back to where it belongs. But in my experience, I do not have jurisdiction over a motion to quash.

But since it sounds like you might have these records, and it's really a privilege issue, I'm going to allow you to make a motion for a protective order. And I do believe I'm probably going to have to look at the documents, too.

So I'm going to give you a briefing schedule on this, because I want to also — one of the things that happens when I'm looking to evaluate whether something is — whether someone is working in a capacity as a consultant or an agent or an expert, is the relationship, because that's really what — it's very fact-specific, and letter briefs usually can't give me

enough factual information to make the determination. Because the first thing have I to do is determine what the relationship is, and I have to determine what would be privileged in that relationship.

So I'm going to give you a briefing schedule on the protective order.

When do you think -- how much time do you --

MR. MANGAS: Next Monday?

THE COURT: That is --

MR. MANGAS: And I have my phone on me. I will tell you.

THE COURT: The 10th.

MR. MANGAS: The 10th?

THE COURT: December 10th. Will that be enough time for you to make sure that I have all the information I need, you know, the motion and whatever affidavits you need in support of that? I don't want to hold this one up, because I also know this is going to go and have some effect on expert depositions which are coming up, I think, not this month, but next month. So we have a little bit of time, but I want to get it briefed before maybe — because I have a huge docket that I'm dealing with.

MR. MANGAS: Well, given that your Honor mentioned affidavits at the end, that's a good point. Could it be the following week, 12/17?

1	THE COURT: I'm fine with that.
2	Mr. Butler?
3	MR. BUTLER: Can we respond by January 3?
4	THE COURT: Yes.
5	MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, will that cover the Steve
6	White?
7	THE COURT: No.
8	MR. MANGAS: Okay.
9	THE COURT: No, we're going to deal with that in a
10	second. It may, depending on how I rule on Steve White. But I
11	want to deal with Steve White separately, and I want
12	Ms. Barbieri to have an opportunity to talk. This is right now
13	just for Catalist.
14	MR. MANGAS: Okay.
15	MR. BUTLER: Your Honor?
16	THE COURT: Yes.
17	MR. BUTLER: I apologize for interjecting.
18	THE COURT: No.
19	MR. BUTLER: This is David Butler.
20	I just want to understand. The brief that's coming in
21	from the plaintiffs, that's going to be their brief, their
22	affidavit and the privilege log?
23	THE COURT: What I'm going to ask yes, because I
24	can't decide privilege without a privilege log. Because they
25	also, you know, need to understand what is being withheld.

What's your position on the privilege log?

MR. MANGAS: Well, your Honor, I think that's quite a burden to impose on a party for — strictly for communications with a consulting expert that postdate the filing of the litigation. I can't tell you off the top of my head today exactly what that volume is.

THE COURT: So this is what I'm going to do. I'm not going to require a privilege log in this case, because it's consulting expert. But if I should find that I don't believe it's consulting expert —

And I do want you to produce the documents to me. How many are there?

MR. MANGAS: You're asking me how many? Your Honor, I don't know.

THE COURT: Give me inches. Less than a box, please.

MR. MANGAS: So a stack like that.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to ask that you produce that ex parte to me. Now, you're going to have to be very thorough on the grounds in which you are withholding documents so that the defendants can have a meaningful opportunity to respond to that. If I find, one, that he's not a consulting expert around, or two, that there are documents in there that I need a more specific type of analysis from the defendants, I will then ask for a privilege log. But on the first step, I'm going to say no, given the fact that he was retained after, and

sounds like he may be a consulting expert.

But you need to give me enough of the facts for both sides so that Mr. Butler and Mr. Levine really understand, you know, the grounds. Because these are very fact-specific analyses that have to be done to determine whether documents should remain attorney work product or not.

MR. MANGAS: Understood, your Honor.

And I want to be very clear for the record. While Catalist is a consulting expert that was engaged by plaintiffs to help them understand voter data and the racially polarized voting analysis, they have provided one file, a 2017 voter file with race data appended, to plaintiffs' experts in this case. That file was disclosed to defendants.

THE COURT: No, I understand that.

MR. MANGAS: And that's the only file that --

THE COURT: That you believe is fact-specific, and, therefore they rest --

MR. MANGAS: And that the testifying experts considered and relied on.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MANGAS: So I actually want to be very clear. I don't want to misrepresent to your Honor --

THE COURT: No.

MR. MANGAS: -- that there's not any information they've provided that's discoverable as a consulting expert.

THE COURT: No, no. You have — you produced what you believe is the factual basis, the factual data in which they produced to the expert for the expert to rely on. But there are other things you have withheld that you believe are attorney work product. And that's what I wanted to focus this motion on.

So Catalist — this will be on Catalist only.

Plaintiffs' motion for protective order is due 12/17.

Defendant, the District's response is January 3rd. The reply is January 10th by the plaintiffs. And I do want the ex parte documents to come in on 12/17. Okay?

MR. MANGAS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So now let's deal with Steve White.

So I did get them to stop doing their work for a little over an hour, so I appreciate that. But I don't think we're going to get any longer. But I think if it becomes truly problematic, we'll call again.

So tell me, why are you withholding Steve White's documents?

MR. MANGAS: So just to be very clear, your Honor, we are not taking the position that the District is prohibited from getting discovery from Mr. White on who he's talked to, what they said, what he said, events that have occurred in the District.

Our objection is solely based on the communications

between Latham and the New York Civil Liberties Union and Mr. White. And also, I believe there may be — I don't believe any documents exist, but to the extent there are documents within the control group of the plaintiffs and their attorneys and Mr. White. As your Honor is aware, the community and the District have some fairly unique attributes, demographics, issues that underlie these Voting Rights Act issues and the school board elections, and might include to a certain extent — and Latham certainly is coming into that — community in that district uninformed about those dynamics and who the players are and how they work and what the history is.

And so the plaintiffs, prior to filing the lawsuit, engaged Mr. White as a consulting expert, to help them work through some of that stuff and to understand the dynamics in the District and who the different players were, and how these elections operate and who participated in the slating organizations, what kind of forms existed in the District, and to get an understanding —

THE COURT: I didn't see any letter attached that retained Mr. White or showed the relationship that you have with Mr. White. How come you didn't attach that?

MR. MANGAS: We have a consulting agreement, our copy consulting agreement, that was given — to provide to your Honor.

THE COURT: Why didn't you include that?

MR. MANGAS: Because we didn't think we would have to produce it.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. MANGAS: And we don't think -- see how it's relevant.

THE COURT: See. Honestly, why is it not relevant?

Why wouldn't it be relevant, when I have to determine what kind of relationship that it's had, whether it's truly a consulting relationship with someone who has clearly been — was a plaintiff in another case, is clearly, you know, akin to a fact witness, who — you know, I don't see — what is the difference between going out and chatting with any other person in the community to find out what they know and doing your due diligence and the investigation, pre—investigation, on this?

You know, Mr. White — I don't have a CV on him. I don't have a résumé on him. I don't have —

Did you pay him? I don't have any invoices? Did you pay Mr. White?

MR. MANGAS: I'm not positive about that.

Do you know?

No, he's not paid.

THE COURT: So I have to tell you that there's some concern with this consulting agreement put into place in order to protect the communications you have with him when he's not really an expert. What is he interpreting that your plaintiffs

1	can't tell you themselves? Like what is he giving you that
2	makes him truly an expert? Has he ever been an expert,
3	declared an expert?
4	MR. MANGAS: Not to my knowledge, your Honor. But to
5	be clear, he's not a testifying expert. He is a consulting
6	expert
7	THE COURT: Doesn't matter.
8	MR. MANGAS: in this case. But no, he's not a
9	THE COURT: What makes him an expert? What makes him
LO	different than just someone in the community who has knowledge?
L1	MR. MANGAS: For all the reasons the defendants cite
L2	in their brief. He is one of the prime activists and been
L3	members involved in the school board elections.
L4	THE COURT: Fact witness. Sounds a lot like a fact
L5	witness.
L6	MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, they're entitled to depose
L7	him as a fact witness. But if they want what they're trying
L8	to do here is just
L9	THE COURT: But how does every conversation you have
20	with him get protected? Just because you have a paper saying
21	he's going to be a consultant?
22	MR. MANGAS: Because we engaged him as a consultant to
23	help us understand and to inform our litigation strategy.

THE COURT: Yes. Okay. There was what -- we're

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not -- because we have been here a long time. I have serious,

very serious doubts. I do not want to support law firms on basically limiting the amount of discovery an opposing party can get by simply finding someone in the community who has previously been an advocate or a, you know, concerned citizen, and basically saying, any conversations you have with them become privileged, simply by signing a consulting agreement with them.

But I firmly believe that this goes in the same category as anything with attorney client to be work-product privileges which I believe are very fact-specific. And I don't believe — this is the one area that I do not usually decide on letter motions, because I don't believe the letter motions can give me enough information, enough factual information. I don't believe that if I denied or, you know, granted their ability to — or deny your motion to quash, that I would have a sufficient record before Judge Seibel to do so.

So to answer Mr. Levine's question, that schedule now will include — and if we need to adjust it — need to include Mr. White, because I need to examine the relationship and the agreement and the case law on whether this is truly a relationship that would warrant the protections of the "attorney work product" privilege as it relates to having consulting experts. I certainly do not want to — I respect that privilege. I think it's an important one to have. But it's important — it's not — it's a qualified privilege. It's

not absolute. And it's also important not to extend it more than it needs to be.

Mr. Levine.

MR. LEVINE: Yes.

Your Honor, there's another practical issue that I just wanted to make sure was addressed, which is that there was a document collection from Mr. White and from his wife, Mrs. White, ongoing, though stopped in the middle, so nothing was obtained. However, the plaintiffs now have sort of injected themselves into the discovery process, and are undertaking that collection from Mr. and Mrs. White themselves.

Are we going to get those documents? Are we going to get a privilege log of documents that are withheld? How is this supposed to work practically, and when can we expect to see these documents?

It's especially important also, because I'll note, while they have their claims of privilege and work product associated with their communications with Mr. White, they have none whatsoever with respect to Mrs. White. And there's no reason at all why they should be inserting themselves into that process.

I mean, we'd also like to take a look at the consulting agreement, as well.

THE COURT: Well, I'm assuming it's going to be part --

MR. MANGAS: We'll attach it to our brief.

THE COURT: -- of the papers. If it's not, they're going to have a problem supporting their argument.

I want to let Ms. Barbieri, who has just stood up, to also respond to this.

But if you could respond to Mr. Levine's question.

Because I'm sure there are records that are not protected by the privilege.

MR. MANGAS: Sure, your Honor. And then, I'll turn over to Ms. Barbieri for the bulk of that.

What I can say is that we were concerned when we found out the District had gone in and grabbed some portion of documents that may contain our privileged — our work product that we're asserting privilege over. And so we asked — and it's one thing we haven't discussed today — that they either return or destroy what they've presently collected. And we've agreed to — we've collected the ESI now from the Whites, and we've agreed to process it on their behalf and turn it over to Ms. Barbieri so that she can review and produce. The only thing that we're asking is that we have a chance to maintain our work—product privilege while that occurs.

My understanding is that the search terms that the defendant asked for included things like the name White, and so it was returning hundreds of thousands of documents. I know that there's been some conversation to whittle that down, but

1 I'll turn that over to Ms. Barbieri and let her discuss that. 2 THE COURT: So let me just ask Mr. Levine one quick 3 question. 4 Do you -- in the aborted discovery retention process 5 that had begun, do you have documents? 6 MR. LEVINE: No. And they know we don't. They said 7 so in their letter, that, you know, the vendors that were sent 8 to the Whites have told the Whites that there was some 9 technical problem. This hasn't worked. We're going to have to 10 come back later. And that's when they got kicked out. 11 THE COURT: So it's not an issue I have to deal with. 12 MR. MANGAS: We're willing to accept the 13 representation the note that he is referring to as a note 14 that's specific to Emilia Whites' computer. Our understanding 15 from the Whites was that there was some portion of information 16 that the vendor had managed to capture an image and then taken 17 with him. If that's not the case, then there's nothing to 18 decide here, but that was our understanding. 19 THE COURT: Mr. Levine? 20 MR. LEVINE: To use the technical term, the vendor got 21 bupkis. 22 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Ms. Barbieri, if you could come up. 23 24 MS. BARBIERI: Good afternoon, your Honor. Nice to

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see you.

THE COURT: Nice to see you again, too.

So I know that you had been working with plaintiffs to gather together the documents, and then to produce those that were deemed nonprivileged.

MS. BARBIERI: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that process still ongoing?

MS. BARBIERI: Yes, it is, your Honor.

As Mr. Levine represented, we did start with the District. The District was extremely generous in allowing us to collect that information. We got waylaid in the process because of the type of collection the District wanted to do. We had a misunderstanding with that process. I believe my e-mails laid out that misunderstanding fairly well, so I won't belabor that point.

So my e-mails with Randy Levine laid out that misunderstanding. And I will say, from the Whites' perspective, they were extremely upset at that process, because their computers were taken apart. They were put to a five-hour ordeal. And now I will say, Mr. White's computer does not work. And he is very concerned that that process had something to do with his hard drive now not working, and does not know what happened, whether the taking apart is in part responsible for his hard drive not working now, or whether the Latham & Watkins process is responsible for his hard drive not working now, and he feels

completely victimized by this entire ordeal, being a third-party witness and not having what he considers to be sufficiently probative information to be subjected to this entire process. But he did want me to relay that to the Court.

THE COURT: Well, he must have enough probative information if he was being retained by plaintiffs' counsel as a consulting expert.

MS. BARBIERI: Yes. Some information, yes. I suspect --

THE COURT: They deemed him valuable.

MS. BARBIERI: Yes. Some information, yes.

So the process, as Mr. Mangas has represented, is now in Latham & Watkins' hands. We have — we have the e-mails of both Mr. White and Mrs. whites have been searched. That process has been accomplished. And we have 99,000 documents, both for Mr. and Mrs. White that have been isolated.

And as Mr. Mangas had represented, 55,000 documents of Mr. White have come back with the term "White" as a result.

And so we have not with the District had an opportunity to meet and confer about this issue. And I'm confident, actually, that the District and I will be able to work out how we're going to modify those search terms accordingly, so that we can reach an agreement as to further drilling down on the search terms, so that we can get a reasonable number of hits and figure out how we're going to work out "White."

1 THE COURT: Who's going to produce the privilege log? 2 MS. BARBIERI: What is going to happen is, Latham & 3 Watkins will review their privilege information with their 4 attorney-client privilege and work product under their name. 5 THE COURT: Has that been culled out yet? 6 MS. BARBIERI: Their name and their documents has been 7 separately searched. My name, Laura Barbieri, Advocates, has 8 also been separately searched. Although the District did not 9 ask for that term to be searched, I inputted it because of 10 Montesa. And so we did Schwartz, as well, Mr. Schwartz's name, 11 as well. And so we separately searched that name so that I 12 could more easily do a privilege log with respect to that 13 information. 14 I am also going to review Latham & Watkins' 15 information. And I hope that, together, we will agree on what 16 is privileged and what is not privileged. 17 Ultimately, it's my responsibility to produce the 18 privilege log to the District, since it's our documents that 19 are being produced. 20 So although Latham & Watkins will have the first cut 21 of those documents, I'm hoping that we don't have any 22 disagreement with respect to the ultimate production. 23 THE COURT: So what do we -- because we really 24 can't --

MS. BARBIERI: What we're --

1 THE COURT: I can't review a motion until I have a 2 privilege log. 3 MS. BARBIERI: Understood. 4 THE COURT: So was kind of type frame? I know you 5 need to meet and confer again with the District. What kind of 6 time frame are we looking at? 7 MS. BARBIERI: And again, this is just with the 8 e-mails. We still have the hard drives to be searched of both 9 Mrs. White and Mr. White. And we have expedited the hard drive 10 search of Mrs. White, because as Mr. Levine has said, and as we 11 had previously agreed, Mrs. White's search is going to be much 12 smaller. So we wanted to try to get Mrs. White's documents 13 produced to the District in a much expedited way. 14 In terms of time, just for the e-mails, I need to 15 consult with the Latham & Watkins, but I don't believe that will be too much longer in order to expedite it with 16 17 meet-and-confer. So I'm anticipating maybe --18 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt. 19 Go ahead. Anticipating maybe? 20 MS. BARBIERI: -- two weeks. 21 THE COURT: And what's the time frame on the hard 22 drives?

MS. BARBIERI: The hard drive is a terabyte hard drive. And so we have identified the files that are going to be searched. We did that I want to say last Friday. So once

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those searches are run, then it's going to be document review.

The documents are quite numerous. I'm thinking a month. And
then the privilege log will have to be produced after that.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Okay. So counsel, what are your thoughts on timing for that motion?

MR. MANGAS: So my only concern, your Honor, is that I know the hit counts for documents, I'll --

Oh, I should also say Russell Mangas on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Your Honor, my only concern is, I know, it's an enormous e-mail system. And we mentioned there are approximately a hundred thousand hits. My understanding — and I can be corrected, because this process goes on — is that there are 1500 or so that hit on attorney names from either Latham & Watkins or the New York Civil Liberties Union. And so I just want to make clear. Is your Honor requiring us to do that review and produce a privilege log of all those documents along with the motion?

THE COURT: Yes. I mean, because we can't -- I can't decide a motion and they can't, you know, oppose the motion without seeing a privilege log. So what do you think timing? It's less than the other. I mean, did Ms. Barbieri say they were?

MR. MANGAS: It's less than Ms. Barbieri asked from

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THE COURT: 99,000 documents?

MS. BARBIERI: We had — I will say that we had discussed with the District in the meet—and—confer potentially narrowing the time frame for the review. We originally had reviewed a time frame from 2005 to 2018, and thought about narrowing the time frame to 2012 to 2018, and the District didn't say no, so . . .

THE COURT: I'm not going to get involved in --

MS. BARBIERI: Before we meet and confer.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BARBIERI: I understand.

THE COURT: I want you guys to continue on in the meet-and-confer process. Understand that the nonprivileged documents need to be produced.

MS. BARBIERI: Understood.

THE COURT: And you need to work together on --

MS. BARBIERI: I appreciate that.

THE COURT: -- pulling that stuff together. And then once -- and I think your privilege log on your documents relating to your prior representation of Mr. White -- you need to do a privilege log, but I also think that --

And I look to Mr. Levine and Mr. Butler. Just nod your head one way or the other.

-- that that, on a priority schedule, goes lower than

1	the production of the documents
2	MS. BARBIERI: Understood.
3	THE COURT: and the privilege log for Latham &
4	Watkins.
5	Is that fair, counsel?
6	MR. MANGAS: Yes. We agree.
7	MS. BARBIERI: Yes.
8	THE COURT: So that needs to be done, but I don't want
9	that to hold up the production of the documents
10	MS. BARBIERI: Understood.
11	THE COURT: or the production of the Latham &
12	Watkins privilege log.
13	MS. BARBIERI: Understood.
14	THE COURT: So continue on with that process.
15	Continue on this week with that process. You know, continue to
16	make as much headway as you can.
17	MS. BARBIERI: Yes, will do.
18	THE COURT: And don't produce as many you know,
19	especially because the ESI may require either a process where
20	you have to kind of try some different words to see if you can
21	narrow the ESI.
22	MS. BARBIERI: Absolutely. We can do that.
23	THE COURT: Okay. Great.
24	So Mr. Mangas.
25	MR. MANGAS: So I mean, a lot of this, I think, will

depend on these negotiations on the ESI and the size that set ultimately is. But (unintelligible) will take a significant amount of time. We're talking about just, you know --

THE COURT: I'm just talking about your Latham & Watkins ones. Because that's your only one — any documents from Latham & Watkins are truly the only ones that you probably can claim any kind of privilege to.

MR. MANGAS: And my understanding, again, just briefly, was informed on the initial set of doc counts, is that it's well over a thousand documents to have. It's not just Latham, but also the New York Civil Liberties Union.

THE COURT: Yes. And I assume it's time frame.

Because you didn't retain him until 2017. When was it? Was it — we were speaking in May. I don't know if the retention was in May or later.

MR. MANGAS: May, we began discussing the retention. We signed the formal agreement in August.

I believe that's correct, your Honor. I mean, I haven't seen the date range of the documents, but I can't imagine why there would be documents predating that.

THE COURT: And maybe they didn't name the NAACP.

MR. MANGAS: Could be with the NAACP or the New York
Civil Liberties Union. I'm not positive.

THE COURT: Yes. So that may narrow -- I'm surprised to hear there's a thousand.

(Pause)

MR. MANGAS: Your Honor, I mean, I would ask for three weeks to get those documents to you, because I think, unfortunately, that puts us right past Christmas and we have a bunch of people on the case that have travel plans and holiday plans. But if we could get three weeks, we will do our very best to get it within three weeks.

THE COURT: Okay. This is what we're going to do. On Mr. White's documents, I want you to get the privilege log to the District by January 2nd. I'm going to request that the parties meet and confer in the next week on that privilege log, 2nd to the 9th, to discuss, you know, if there's — if there are documents that the District believes, you know, are not privileged, or they need follow up questions, I want to give you guys a week after getting it to have that discussion.

And then, do you want to set the motion schedule now for this? Because I know we're going to have to get a motion for me to decide this, unless you can convince —

Mr. Butler, if you saw the consulting retainer agreement, or Mr. Levine, would that be enough for you to determine that this was a consulting expert, and you just want to make sure that the documents that were being withheld were truly privileged, or are you still going to want to have the Court decide this issue?

MR. BUTLER: We don't know.

THE COURT: Okay. This is what you're going to do.
You're going to produce them the consulting agreement.

MR. MANGAS: We can do that today.

THE COURT: Yes. You're going to do it this week.

And then you're going to have the privilege log to them on January 2nd. By January 9th, you will have met and conferred. By January 11th, you're going to write to me and let me know if you guys need this issue to be tee'd up to the Court, and you're going to put in that letter a proposed briefing schedule on it. You're either going to tell me the issue is moot and — or "We need to brief this."

MR. MANGAS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay?

(Pause)

THE COURT: Okay. The final issue that I have on the pre-motion letters deals with the District's motion for Mrs. White's — to show cause why she failed to appear at a deposition. Can we get — can we deal with this quickly?

MR. BUTLER: I think so, your Honor.

David Butler for the District.

If this issue was uncertain enough for Ms. Barbieri to have to call Mr. Levine to say something, and she left a message, "Call me," it was important enough or uncertain enough for her to have to tell us that Mrs. White was not going to be showing up for a deposition the next day. Instead, nobody told

us. We showed up. We had a court reporter. We expended time.

And she doesn't show up. And then afterwards, we find out,

"Oh, you never returned my call, so I never told you that she wasn't going to show up."

Our request here is not scorched earth. It is very modest. We ask only to be reimbursed for the cost of the court reporter having shown up and being sent home.

THE COURT: What was the bust fee?

MR. BUTLER: \$178. And that's all we're asking for.

And, of course, we also want an order directing her to show up for a deposition. But in terms of --

THE COURT: I don't think you're going to need that. She's going to show up once the documents are produced.

MR. BUTLER: Okay.

THE COURT: Ms. Barbieri, while you're here, do you want to give a response to this?

MS. BARBIERI: Yes, your Honor.

At no time did we ever agree to a deposition that was before documents were to be produced. At no time. And Randy Levine and David Butler knew this. Every single one of my e-mails was contingent on documents being produced. And I produced, I think, nine e-mails. I can go through each of those e-mails where every single one of them says, "Contingent upon documents being produced, we will schedule that deposition." And even my e-mails say, "Tentatively, the 12th

1 of November. Tentatively, the 12th of November, dependent on 2 documents being produced." And when I called Randy Levine on 3 the 9th of November, I said, "Please call me about" --4 THE COURT: When was the deposition scheduled for? 5 MS. BARBIERI: It was scheduled for -- originally, it 6 was --7 THE COURT: When did the bust happen? 8 MS. BARBIERI: -- scheduled for the 16th of October. 9 And we had postponed that, because we were going to produce 10 documents. And then thereafter, we had scheduled documents to 11 be produced contingent upon the deposition. 12 THE COURT: What was the bust date? What was the date 13 they showed up and paid --14 MS. BARBIERI: Say it again. 15 THE COURT: What was the date they showed up and 16 Ms. White did not? 17 MS. BARBIERI: November 12th. That was Veterans' Day. 18 So in my e-mail --19 Should I wait for you or --20 THE COURT: No. 21 MS. BARBIERI: -- should I talk? 22 Okay. So in my e-mail, which is the first e-mail that 23 I have appended to my letter, the e-mail on October 13th, which 24 is my first conversation recapping our conversations together,

I say, "We agree that it's likely that Emilia White's

deposition may precede Steve's, because the documents that are going to be produced will be easier and faster." That's Item Number 7 on my October 13th e-mail.

Then, on my second e-mail that I appended, I say again that "The collection process has been frustrated," that we again are appending that e-mail, because we need the collection to go first before any depositions are going to be taken.

We're arguing about collection again. And collection is going to precede depositions. We're arguing about collection before depositions.

And then, in Exhibit 5 regarding depositions, "As I might have mentioned, Emilia White is off on Mondays. It would be a tremendous hardship for her to be deposed" —

THE COURT: Which -- can you? Which docket? It's 217-1.

MS. BARBIERI: Yes. I am referring to my letter on —
to the District that is in response to — it's dated

November 14th, 2018.

THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. Thank you.

MS. BARBIERI: And so my Exhibit 5, which is the November 2nd e-mail, I'm saying regarding depositions, "As I might have mentioned, she's off on Mondays, so it would be extremely hardship of hers to be deposed on any other day. So I propose the 12th, assuming documents can be reviewed and produced in time."

And that e-mail goes on to say, "Laura, from Randall. We will get back to you once we connect with our vendor and check everyone's calendars regarding the suggested depositions dates." I'm sorry. That was David. "Let's tentatively reserve 11/12 for Emilia, and 12/14 for Steve."

And then I respond, "Okay. Assuming document production and all, these dates are acceptable."

Again, my responses are always contingent on document production.

And then with William Craven's e-mail on November 2nd, after our meet-and-confer, which we had an extensive meet-and-confer on document productions, he outlines our meet-and-confer. And on the date, Number 5 — this is Exhibit 6, dates for document production and depositions. We agreed that "The production of documents responsive to subpoenas and depositions of your clients must be completed before November 5th — 19th." That's when the Court's schedule had been that all depositions had been — had to occur before the 19th. So we were operating under that deadline. So that was the Court's schedule for the parties' depositions.

"You provided us with potential deposition dates for your clients' depositions as soon as possible. And if anything in these e-mails does not accurately reflect our agreement, please let us know." So I wrote that.

Item Number 5 in my e-mail writing back, "These are

the Court's deadlines to the parties, as you have indicated. I am out of the country on November 19th. I will endeavor to complete document review as quickly as humanly possible, but I'm not super human. I do have other obligations. I will try to adhere to the schedule you are proposing as fast as possible."

I also had put before that, "Should I" — I was asking whether I should bring a motion to quash based on the timing of everything.

So I had decided not to do that, but I said, "I will try to get this by October -- by November 19th as best as possible." And that was with respect to the deposition dates, as well as the document review.

I had made the same point --

THE COURT: So this is — this is what I'm going to do on this one. I'm going to deny it. I believe that this was a miscommunication. So I'm going to deny the District's motion for the fee. But I am going to direct that Ms. White has to appear for deposition after the production of her documents, which I think was — is your intention.

MS. BARBIERI: Thank you. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further we need to deal with today? Otherwise, I would like to look at a calendar and schedule — ask you when you think you need to come back.

(Pause)

1	MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, this is David Butler.
2	In light of the fact that we have some scheduled
3	activity at the beginning of January, maybe it makes sense to
4	schedule something in the middle of January, just to see where
5	we're up to?
6	THE COURT: I was thinking after the Catalist is fully
7	briefed by January 10th. I'm looking at my calendar for
8	something. I would say
9	Ms. Hummel, how bad is the week of the 21st for me?
10	MR. BUTLER: Can we do it the earlier week, your
11	Honor?
12	THE COURT: The problem on that earlier week on the
13	14th, is, I don't know if I have any time.
14	Ms. Hummel, looking at the 14th or 16th, do I have
15	or the 16th, do I have
16	(Pause)
17	THE COURT: And when you're looking at the afternoon,
18	you're looking at 2:00 p.m, or later?
19	Okay, counsel.
20	MR. BUTLER: Seems to work for everyone here, your
21	Honor.
22	THE COURT: 2:00 p.m., on the 16th?
23	(Pause)
24	THE COURT: Okay. So we will meet on January 16th.

I may have questions for you on the motions if I have

a chance to at least quickly look at it prior to that, because we'll get them in on the -- post them in on the 10th. So keep that in mind. Okay?

ALL COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have a good day.